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The existing Intrusion Detection Systems often generate
alerts that represent only a sub attack of the attack, which
the attacker is trying to accomplish. There is no work
previously been carried out to implicitly link alerts
together to discover attack plans from generated alerts.
This paper proposes the system frame-work for behavior
driven dynamic visual intrusion detection system that can
be used to find out implicit relationships among alerts and
discover attack plans which consist of smaller attacks,
carried out in some particular sequential order. The paper
also talks about how dynamic visualization along with the
static visualization can be used for the visualization of
alert and attack structures.
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1. Introduction
There has been significant increase over the past few
years in the quantity of information. This has created a
need for large scale networks and vice versa. The
continued growth of e-commerce and the increase in
global interconnection of computer systems has led to an
increase in the number of malicious network attacks. As
a result in today's wired and wireless world, attackers can
cause damage worth million of dollars. The attacks can
range from denial of service attack, and cyber-graffiti to
corporate espionage. These attacks carried out by hackers
and their tools can cause companies and individuals to
lose money from loss of productivity to actual data being
stolen from their machines. According to a recent survey,
[3] many companies are worried about the increased
sophistication of threats against their computer systems.
The cause of these attacks includes poorly written
software, lack of unified security infrastructure, and
understaffed IT departments.
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The intrusion detection systems are the tools that the
organizations usually employ to protect their networks
from these attacks. These tools collect network
information from various advantages within the network,
and analyze the information for intrusions. However there
are no perfect intrusion detection systems or mechanisms.
It is impossible for the intrusion detection systems to get
all the packets in the network system. Especially the
unknown attacks can hardly be found. The best that can
be done is to optimize the way intrusion information is
displayed and related to determine past vulnerabilities.
The study of these past vulnerabilities then can be used to
minimize the number of attacks occurring in a particular
network and correct systems from these vulnerabilities by
using past observations.
The Contemporary Intrusion Detection systems (IDSS)
generate alerts independently, though there may be logical
connections between them. These logical connections
between alerts can be used to relate alerts and discover
attacks consisting of smaller steps, which are raised by
IDSs as independent alerts. In this paper we discuss the
system frame-work for behavior driven dynamic visual
intrusion detection system to logically connect alerts with
each other to describe the attack that may compromise of
several steps. We believe that the problem of network
intrusions can be further reduced to some extent by both
visualizing these attacks and network traffic generated by
the IDS alerts and logically linking alerts together to
discover attack lifecycle. By the use of visualization,
system administrators can more quickly and efficiently
identify trends on their networks. The identification of
these trends in a network traffic, can even allow a below
average system administrator to clearly identify the
problems and vulnerabilities in their network.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
reviews related work. Section 3 introduces our approach.
Section 4 outlines our framework. Section 5 discusses its
advantages. Section 6 provides conclusion. Section 7
outlines future research.
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2. Previous Related Work
There have been many proposed innovative techniques
both in visualization and alert correlation to facilitate
detection of intrusions for computer networks. However,
none of these techniques combine visualization and alert
correlation in a way to develop and display attack plans
and attack states to assist intrusion analysis.
The recent emerging importance of intrusion detections
has allowed the development of tools like NIVA [2]. It
allows interactive analysis of intrusion data to detect
structured attacks using static visualization. The user can
explore the three dimensional space populated by
intrusion data. However it does not relate the structured
attacks with each other to extract meaningful insights
such as attack plans, and attack lifecycle.
Harrop, and Armitage [4] discuss the use of dynamic
visualization to display real-time network traffic
information. They discuss a use of visual properties, such
as shape, size, location, and color to represent IP address,
port number, and content of the IP packets. They have
developed a prototype which provides a mapping of
network metrics to visual metaphors. Again their work, as
with the case of NIVA, only provides visualization and
analysis of IDS logs. There is no attempt to link IDS
generated alerts with each other and display them using
either static or dynamic visualization to uncover
relationship between attacks, direction of the attacks, and
the worm activity etc.
Another article by Frincke, and Erbacher [5] describes the
visualization technique that they have developed for
analysis of network attacks. It involves generating an
event list by parsing the database. The event list is then
used for visualization. The tool that they have developed
uses two dimensional space to represent various different
network entities such as a circle to represent nodes,
distance to represent difference in IP address of the other
hosts from the node in question, and different types of
lines to show traffic. The color is used to represent time of
the day. Their developed tool can be used to identify
attacks consisting of individual steps. However the
identification can be carried out on only temporally
related attacks (sub attacks).
The work by Cuppens, and Miege [I] provides alert
correlation that can be used to discover causal, and
implication relationships among alerts. Hence discover
attack scenarios, and attack plans. They relate IDS
generated alerts using full or partial matches of pre-
condition for a particular alert with a post condition of
some previously generated alert. The pre condition refers
to the condition that is necessary for a particular attack or
alert to succeed. The post condition indicates the
consequence of an alert if it succeeds. These pre and post
conditions are given as predicates derived from attack
database described in attack specification language
LAMBDA [1]. The implication relationship is discovered
by using ontology rules. The paper by Cuppens, and
Miege [I], concentrates on merging alerts together that
refers to the occurrence of same type of an attack to
reduce the number of alerts generated by IDSs. And hence
provide easy management of these alerts by the security
administrators. It does not deal with visualization of these
alerts.
Our work deals with both the visualization of intrusion
alerts as well as correlation of these alerts to achieve
visualization. We combine both the information
visualization especially dynamic visualization, and alert
correlation to discover attacks consisting of several
smaller steps. However we use our own novel techniques
to both display and correlate intrusion data and find the
implicit relationships between attacks. They will be
discussed in the next section of this paper.
The work presented by Cuppens, and Miege [1], is closest
to ours in respect to alert correlation. However our
approach has several differences to suit our purpose.
Whereas the purpose of their work is to merge similar
alerts together. Our aim is to investigate attacks and attack
steps. Our method allows alert aggregation both during
and after alert correlations, while their approach only
treats alert as a separate stage before the correlation of
alerts. By allowing alert aggregation both during and
after alert correlations, our technique can allow interactive
analysis of attacks consisting of smaller sub-attacks. Our
work also uses visualization to display state information
of a particular attack. For instance the attack can be at a
growing stage or at a maturing stage when it has affected
the targeted machine/so The state information of an attack
will allow the security analyst to visually discover life
cycle of a particular attack and hence this will increase
their understanding about the structure of the attack.
3. Proposed New Approach
In this section we discuss our technique used for alert
correlation to discover attack plans. The approach consists
of two steps. The first step consists of grouping alerts
such that alerts within a single group have similar
characteristics, while alerts in different groups are
dissimilar without any sirnilarties. The second step
involves relating implicitly alerts together within the same
group with each other using predicates to discover attacks
consisting of smaller IDS generated alerts.
3.1 Grouping Alerts
The alerts can be grouped together or formed into clusters
based on some similarity rules. We defme our similarity
rules in the form of concept hierarchies [6]. The concept
hierarchy is an important source for inductive learning
[6]. We use concept hierarchies for attributes of the
generated alerts to derive similarity between alerts. Figure
I on the next page shows how the concept hierarchy can
be used for both the IP address and port number. The
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concept hierarchy will provide a generalization of
hierarchy on selected attributes of the alerts. For instance
a concept hierarchy on a particular attribute such as port
number may give port SOas a private port. The two alerts
can then be related by closer their attributes such as port
numbers are using the concept hierarchy for a port
number. For example if port numbers from both alerts get
generalized to private port then they can be related to each
other by this generalization.
The IDS generated alerts consists of several attributes
such as source ip address, destination address, and alert
type. These attributes can be used to defme the alerts as
tuples over the Cartesian product Zal x Za2 x ... Zan
where Zan represents the possible values for some an
attribute of some alert. We can use this technique of alert
tuples over the Cartesian product to define a concept
hierarchy for any particular attribute. The concept
hierarchy will be in the form of a tree on all the elements
of Zan. For two elements y, y e Zan. The y can be called a
parent or generalization of y if there is a direct edge from
y -7 y in the concept hierarchy for Zan.
Figure I shows the concept hierarchies for both an IP
address and port number. The diagram illustrates how the
concept hierarchies can be used to derive the similarity
among alert attributes. From Figure Ia we can see Ip
address Ip7 is a www-server, is a internal machine, is any
Ip address. We now proceed to show more clearly this
relationship. The relationship can be expressed as Ip7 ~
WWW-server ~ Internal ~ All-Ip. Similarly Ip address
IpS is a www-server, is an internal machine, is any Ip
address. This can be expressed by IpS ~ WWW-server
~ Internal ~ All-Ip. The two IP addresses Ip7, and IpS
can be related by the generalization of their values using
the concept hierarchy as shown in the diagram. Both have
www-server as their parent, which in tum has internal
machines as its parent and so on. We can relate them by
using www-server as the first level generalization.
So far we have shown the use of Ip addresses and port
numbers to achieve similarity relations among alert
attributes. We can also include time-stamps. The concept
hierarchy for the attribute timestamp can be produced to
generalize the timestamps based on their time of
occurrence. For instance the time-stamp ti can be a
Monday, which is a week day, and finally week day can
be any day of the week.
We can extend this approach from comparison of
attributes according to their similarities using concept
hierarchies to alerts in general. By using a similar notation
as we have used above, let A, and A e (Zai ... Zan) be two
alerts. By again referring to Figure I clearly we can
conclude alert A is a parent of A if there is an edge A ~
A and also for all attributes of A and all attributes of A
there are edges such that for each attributes ili c A there is
a directed edge to ai e A. If these conditions hold we can
generalize the alerts to specific groups or clusters. Since
as can be seen from the above paragraph the similarity
depends on the level of generalization. Next we define the
level of generalization as ~(A,A) = L: ~(aie A, a; e A) for
all i= I to i=n. We need to achieve minimized level of
generalization to achieve meaningful similar alert
clusters. For instance we can group alerts together using a
generalized alert represented by a triple, (FIREWALL,
PRIVATE PORT, MONDAY). This will allow any alerts
that have their destination IP addresses belonging to a
firewall category in a concept hierarchy for all Ips with
ports of communication belonging to a private port in a
concept hierarchy shown for ports in the diagram below.
And time stamps which can be generalized to Monday
using the concept hierarchies for time stamps to be
grouped together for further investigation.
B"-" Any-Port
Private Port ~ Pub~
1~24 102~
Figural. The figures both A and B shows concept
hierarchy for the source or destination IP address and
port number of an alert.
The next section discusses how the group of similar alerts
derived by using above approach can be further related to
each other using predicates to discover attacks consisting
of several smaller IDS generated alerts.
3.2 Correlating Alerts
This section introduces an approach that can be used to
implicitly link alerts together with each other based on
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using predicates and ontological rules. The alerts may
have associated with them pre-conditions and post
conditions to specify requirements for an alert to succeed
and effects of an alert [1]. These pre, and post conditions
can be represented by the set of predicates. These
predicates can then be used to relate alerts together based
on a common relationship among predicates. To further
improve our correlation model for alerts, we introduce a
set of ontological rules containing pair of pre and post
conditions for attacks. These rules can then be used to
indirectly link alerts together to discover implicit links
between them. By implicitly linking alerts together we
can discover links between earlier attacks that are used by
attackers to carry out later attacks. The next two sections
discuss these techniques in more detail.
3.2.1 Using Predicates. Clearly if an early attack is to
prepare for a later attack, the post condition of the earlier
attack should at least partly or completely satisfy the pre
condition of the later attack. We can use predicates to
represent pre/post conditions of attacks. The predicates
can then be used to discover the similarity relations
among alerts. For instance a port scanning alert generated
by particular IDS may discover TCP service vulnerable to
a certain buffer overflow attack. We can use a predicate
TCPVULTOBOF (Ip_victim, Portvictim) to represent the
post condition (effects) of an attack. Now if another attack
that is detected and reported by an IDS requires the TCP
service sensitive to the buffer overflow attack for the
same victim Ip and port, then we can use the same
predicate to represent a pre-condition for an alert
generated for this attack. And both alerts can be correlated
with each other by the use of same predicate.
Next we introduce a notion of generic alert types, which
will have associated with them pre/post conditions for
attacks. They will be used to represent the pre and post
condition of each type of alert and encode the knowledge
about a type of attack. The instances of different generic
alert types will be used to represent alerts received from
IDSs. Each generic-alert type G will consist of a triple
(set(attributes), pre-condition, post-condition), in which
set (attributes) is a set of attribute names, and pre-
condition or post-condition is a logical combination of
predicates whose variables are all in set/attributes}.
For an instance h of Generic-alert type G, if the logical
combination of all its pre-conditions is true, then it
implies that this attack is successful. And if logical
combination of post-conditions is true, then that implies
the possible consequent attack. The instance h will consist
of a finite set of tuples E set(attributes} of G with each
tuple having associated interval based timestamp (begin,
and end time). When given alert instance h of Generic-
alert type G, the pre-condition of h (or post-condition of
h) will be the predicates of G indicating pre/post
conditions for G. We may have conjunction or disjunction
of predicates to represent pre and post conditions for a
particular alert. Hence we will have the set of all
predicates that appear in both pre and post conditions of
G, denoted by Pre/G), and Pos(G). Similarly for an
instance h they will be represented as Pre(h), and Posth).
Now to relate two instances hI, and h2 together, we can
do the following, if there exists pred E Pre(h2} and (pred)
r;; Pos(hl} such that for all p E (pred), p.end-time <
pred.begin-time and the conjunction of all the predicates
in Pos(hl) implies pred E Pre(h2) then by this approach,
we can capture the implicit relationships between these
two alert instances. By saying that occurrence of instance
hi has caused an occurrence of h2. The implication here
also means having common predicates pred E (Pre(h2),
Posthl l}. And relating instances based on these common
predicates.
This technique will also allow us to reduce the number of
false positive alerts. For instance suppose there is a
sequence Seq of generic-alert instances, an instanc~ A E
Seq is a correlated instance if there exists another A such
that either A prepares for A or A prepares for A. If A is not
correlated with other instances, we can call this alert A as
a one-off event or a false positive. And can remove it
from the sequence.
We can use directed acyclic graphs to represent
relationships among alert instances. They allow us to
create precedences among alerts. We can use alert
instances created from generic alert types as nodes in the
directed acyclic graph and edges to create precedence
among instances. For instance for some sequence
Seq= {AJ, A2, A3,A4,A5} of alert instances by using our
alert correlation approach as stated above, assume we
discover the Pos(AJ} implies Pre(A2) » Pos(A2} implies
Pre(A4) » Pos(A4} implies Pre(A5} » Pos(A5} implies
Pre(A3) »Pos(A3). This fmding will allow a discovery of
the actual attack and its lifecycle consisting of smaller
steps in the form of the alert instances. The attack can
then be represented as directed acyclic graph as shown
below.
• __:~S(AJ} Pos(A4}
~ ---_. A4 A
A2
Pos(A2)
Figure2. The figure shows directed acyclic graph for
an attack consisting of several smaller steps. The
broken arrow indicates partial implication of Pos(Al)
and Pre(A4).
3.2.2 Using Ontological Rules. Next we discuss the use
of ontologies as a high level conceptual modeling
approach for describing knowledge that can be used to
implicitly link unrelated alerts together by the use of
ontological rules. The work presented by Cuppens, and
Miege [1], uses ontological rules to relate alerts. However
they use ontologies to only merge similar alerts together
and do not use them to discover attack steps as in our
case. We use ontologies to describe implication
relationship among predicates.
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Suppose we have two alert instances A and A without any
common predicates between them. Clearly we cannot
relate these two instances together by using pre(A}, and
post(A} without having any implication relationship
between Pre(A} and post(A}. We can derive this
implication by using ontological rules. By using
ontological rules we can find an indirect link between
alerts. The ontological rules will be in the form of pair of
pre and post condition predicates outlining a necessary
condition for an attack. For instance suppose as in [I] we
have an alert instance which involves port scan and
another instance which involves carrying out a denial of
service attack against a window based OS machine. Now
in order for a denial of service attack to succeed the
attacked machine needs to be windows based. The
attacker can carry out port scan for scanning a NetBios
port to check whether the NetBios session is open to carry
out their attack. The port scan alert instance A may have
an associated with itself a post-condition predicate
ExistHost(ip=129.122.12.1, port=139 (Netliiost). Next
we may have another generated instance A for denial of
service attack for windows based machine with a pre-
condition predicate stating the pre-condition for an attack
as Os(ip=129.122.12.1, Os type= Windows}. Both A, and
A will not be related with each other. However by having
an ontological rule say R, we can state both predicates as
pre, and post conditions for an attack in their general from
as ExistHost(ip_address, port=139 (NetBios)), and
Os(ip_address, Os_type=Windows} and relate them by
using the R with each other. The figure given below
generalizes this idea and illustrates how ontological rules
can be used to discover indirect connections between
alerts. The rules can be related with each other and alerts
with rules to find indirect links between alerts.
Once an attack is discovered by using above techniques
we can further analyze the attack by concentrating on a
particular aspect of an attack such as destination ip
address and related attacks with common aspect. We can
use focusing constraint that will also be a predicate, and
relate attacks for which the focusing constraint is true
such as Known(ip_source,ip_dest).
Figure3. The figure shows how ontological rules can
be used to indirectly relate alerts together, the alert A
is related to alert A via RI, R3, R2, and R4.
4. System Frame Work
In this section we present the frame work of our proposed
system (see Figure4) and discuss the design and
development of our on-line visual intrusion alert
correlator.
The alert preprocessor initially processes the raw alerts to
transform them into a unique format for easy analysis.
They are then stored into a relational database alert Db1.
The cluster generator is used next to group alerts together
based on similarity rules according to the conceptual
hierarchies explained in section 3.1 of this paper. The
resulted groups are stored in a another relational database
Db2 for further processing. The visualization console is
connected to Db2 for clustered visualization of alert data.
The alert instance generator uses the Db2 to generate
instances of alerts based on generic alert types with
pre/post conditions. It will generate one instance of a
particular generic alert type from each alert and aggregate
multiple similar alerts into one alert instance using the
information in the expert knowledge database. The expert
knowledge database will contain the necessary
information about generic-alert types as well as
implication relationships between predicates in the form
of ontologies. We can store these relationships between
predicates in a XML file. The diagram given on the next
page shows the system architecture for our proposed
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Figure4. The figure shows the system architecture of
our proposed system with all the necessary
components.
The correlation tool is used for performing the actual
correlation task using the alert instances for various
groups of alerts created by the instance generator and the
auxiliary data provided by the expert knowledge database.
When the correlation tool reads in the alert instances, it
generates the pre/post condition sets of each instance and
uses them to find all the prepare-for relationships between
generic-alerts types instantiated by the alert instance
generator. After alert correlation phase, the correlated
alerts are inserted into a generated alert instance Db for
analysis. The correlated alerts from the database are
extracted and are transformed into readable form (graphs,
text, and glyphs) to user. This operation is done by an
analysis tool, and visualization consoles as shown in the
Figure 4. Next we discuss in greater detail the
visualization for our proposed system.
4.1 Visualization
This section of the paper discusses the design of our
information visualization tool to support viewing,
monitoring, and analysis of correlated alerts derived by
using methods described in section 3. The computer
security specialists use output from IDSs along with other
resources such as network and firewall logs to keep
abreast of potential security threats. These outputs employ
tools such as NIVA [2] for visual displays of alert data to
reduce false positives and reduce cognitive load of the
analyst by taking advantage of information visualization
to amplify cognition [8]. Although information
visualization is a natural choice for displaying intrusion
alerts. However there has been little research into
implicitly linking alerts together and displaying them as
part of the same attack. Our visualization technique is
based on displaying alert data using 2D and 3D displays.
Information visualization principles described by
Shneiderman [9]: "overview first, zoom and filter, then
details on demand" will be used in our visualization
approach. We employ three types of visualization
techniques integrated together by a single visualization
console. The clustered visualization will be used to
visualize grouped alerts according to similar properties.
The database visualization will be used to display explicit
relationships among alerts using two and three
dimensional displays and by using static visualization.
The dynamic visualization will be used to display attacks
and their lifecycles. The attack lifecycle will be formed by
discovering implicit relationships among alerts.
4.1.1 Clustered Visualization. Our visualization tool will
use multi level clustering to display IDS generated alert
information. The clustered visualization will follow
Shneiderman's [9] visualization principles compromising
of overview and zooming of the collected alert data. The
clusters will be formed from group of attackers
performing the same kind of activities on the home
network machines. These clusters will be used to
generate second level clusters showing external
computers attacking more than one home network
computer distinguished by attack types. The second level
clusters will be used for obtaining a more detailed view
consisting of home network hosts affected by a particular
external host belonging to a particular level two cluster.
Hence second level clusters will be used to obtain third
level clusters consisting of home network hosts according
to attack type by an external host machine. The third level
cluster formation will allow security analyst to see which
local hosts are affected by which type of an attack.
The third level clustering will be used for obtaining an
overview of the collected alert data. Now to extract
deeper insight into the gathered data, we will allow
zooming. The zooming will be achieved by selecting a
single or multiple hosts from a level three cluster. The
zooming will allow the security analyst to analyze
intrusive traffic between selected residential hosts and
external hosts.
In order to facilitate zooming, a representation of
residential hosts will be shown with lines from individual
hosts communicating with an external node in the ip
space. The lines will be used to encode attack
information. The color for lines will be used to represent
the directionality of the communication. For instance a
red line could represent a dual communication between a
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computer on a home network and an outside network
computer. The line will be used as an indicator to see if a
residential host on home network both received and sent
data packets to an external host. Similarly a blue line
could represent a packet sent from a home network
computer, which never received a response. A yellow line
can be used to encode a packet that was sent to a home
computer, but the home computer never replied back.
The Figure 5 illustrates how the line encoding will





















FigureS. The figure shows an example of ping sweep
attack by an external host.
Figure 5 shows an instance of ping sweep attack. The
attacking node is located outside the dashed circle. The
filling of the outer circle of the attacking node indicates
the external node status. The ring of circles indicates hosts
which have been attacked. The color of the rings shows
the protocols used by the attacking node. The local nodes
will encode port information to indicate what ports have
been opened up for communication with an external node.
To acconunodate changes in a communication pattern
between an internal node, and an external node, a time
slider will be incorporated.
4.1.2 Database Visualization. Next we discuss database
visualization, which will allow both filtering and details
on demand described by Shneiderman [9]. The clustered
visualization will allow the visualization of the
communication between internal and external hosts. The
next insight that is desired is to know how many packets
were communicated between external hosts and internal
residential hosts. Many current systems do not include
this information. It is not simply enough to show
communication between internal network computers, and
external hosts. There is a need to also show how much
communication actually happened. This can be provided
by providing an interactive visual environment
compromising of two areas base plane, and floating nodes
[2]. The base plane will contain three dimensional bars
representing external nodes attacking internal network
hosts. The size of the bars will indicate net packet
eXChanges with the internal hosts with taller bars
indicating large amount of packet exchanges.
By clicking on each of these bars the circular floating
nodes will be shown on top of the base plane. These
nodes will be internal hosts affected by a particular
external host. The floating nodes will be shown as spheres
with size of the sphere will indicate total number of
packets exchanged with a particular external node. At any
time the operator of the system will be able to also see
what percentage of the overall traffic a particular
computer contributes to an external host. It will be shown
as a label next to a sphere in floating nodes. This type of
database visualization will allow a security analyst to
build a cognitive map of their findings and help them
detect attack patterns and hence plarmed structured
attacks .
4.1.3 Dynamic Visualization. The 2D displays will be
used for continuous monitoring without the need for
focused attention. They will provide a starting point for
recognizing and flagging alerts that require further
analysis in a way that can be done quickly and effectively
as well as visualize the evolution of an attack using graph
drawing technique defined by Collberg [10]. They will
provide overview information with ability to allow
exploration, and filtering of data and provide details on
demand as described by Shneiderman [9]. The dynamic
queries [8] will be used for interactive exploration of alert
data represented by 2D displays. The dynamic queries
enable a very powerful mechanism for information
visualization by allowing visualization to be modified on
the fly as security analyst modifies the range of interest
within the domains of the various attributes of the
visualized information. The diagram given below gives a
user interface to our 2D display.
The diagram only illustrates the basic user screen for
attacks occurring on a particular host. The prototype will
have a more detailed screen for displaying attack
information for individual hosts including double-dragbox
sliders for date, month, and year etc. The attack area on
the left hand side of the user screen shows the attacks
occurred or currently occurring attacks. The glyphs are
colored to indicate the types of an attack and attack
severity level. The glyphs shaped as diamond labeled with
? indicates currently undetermined attacks, the attacks
that are still in progress. The screen also allows user to
switch to a display for individual attacks containing
several steps for a particular attack and visualize attack
states. This is done by clicking on an individual attack.















Figure6. The figure shows the basic information
visualization screen for displaying network attacks for
individual hosts.
The screen shown in Figure 7 will display related alerts
with each other as shown above along with state
information of the attack by pointing over to a particular
node with a mouse. The state information will be a text
based information describing consequence (post
condition) of a particular alert. By allowing the post
condition of each alert to be displayed, we can show the
state of the attack during its different phases. The dotted
line in the diagram shows indirect links between alerts,
where the post-condition of one alert has partially










Figure7. The figure shows the basic information
visualization screen of a single attack consisting of
several smaller steps.
The double dragbox sliders are disabled here in this
screen. The drop down menu as shown in the diagram
above as a colored rectangle will allow the user to switch
between different display screens, both 2-dimensional and
3-dimensional. It will allow the user to both go back to
the main navigational screen or a 3-dimensional display.
The option will also be provided by the drop down menu
for a multiple displays illustrating attacks on a particular
host related by common pre/post conditions. These
conditions will be displayed on the user screen for
highlighting common similarities between attacks. The
multiple views will also be used for representing different
stages of the same attack differentiated by time. The color
of the nodes will indicate alert severity level with red for
instance indicating very severe alert and light blue
indicating milder alert.
5. Conclusion
We presented the frame-work for a behavior driven
dynamic visualization system for network intrusions to
discover attacks which consist of a series of smaller
attacks preparing for later attacks. The development of
such a tool will enable system administrators to more
quickly and efficiently identify attack trends. The types of
packets sent, which ports were used, the number of
packets sent etc. The visualization console will allow the
user to not only see information contained in thousands of
lines in a single snapshot but also discover state
information of a currently occurring attack. Our work
will allow the removal of isolated alerts, the alerts that are
not co-related with other alerts, and hence also reduce
false positives.
6. Future Work
Our next step is to produce the initial prototype which
uses our correlation model for implicitly linking alerts
together and provide dynamic visualization to query the
alert database for changes in the database and reflect these
changes in the visualization console. Once the initial
prototype is complete, we will extend it by having cross
correlation between alerts belonging to different alert
clusters derived by conceptual hierarchies.
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